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Abstract / Summary 
  Cooperative purchasing is becoming more and more common practice. However, 
many cooperative initiatives end prematurely or do not flourish. Important reasons indi-
cated for these problems are directly or indirectly related to the unfair allocation of gains. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse causes of unfairness in current cooperative 
practices, and in particular unfairness resulting from using the Equal Price allocation 
concept. I suggest that the unfair effects of this commonly used concept are caused by 
neglecting a specific part of the added value of cooperative initiative members. 
Moreover, I prove that when using the Equal Price concept organisations will receive 
fewer gains if they increase their volume past 38% of the total volume of a cooperative 
initiative. In case of a constant total volume I prove that Equal Price reaches its maximum 
pay-off when the volume of an organisation equals 25%. I conclude by emphasizing the 
importance of cooperative members becoming aware of allocation concept problems. 
Further research will involve possible solutions to these problems.   
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Introduction 
 
Cooperative purchasing initiatives as purchasing consortia, purchasing groups, and buying 
offices are not a new idea (Hendrick, 1997). Studies of cooperative purchasing go back as far 
as 1927 (Mitchell). Ever since, many definitions have been used for cooperative purchasing. 
In this paper cooperative purchasing is defined as the sharing or bundling of purchasing 
related information, experiences, processes, resources or volumes to improve the performance 
of all participating organisations. 
Cooperative purchasing has received relatively little attention in purchasing 
management research. In addition, cooperative purchasing research so far has focused 
primarily on inductive explanations of practice and qualitative deductive reasoning (Laing, 
1997; Mudambi, 2004). The use of quantitative deductive reasoning has been limited until 
now (Essig, 1998; Heijboer, 2003). The lack of research attention seems unjustified, with 
cooperative purchasing being more and more well-established (Doucette, 1997; Macie, 1995; 
Major, 1997; Sickinger, 1996; Zentes, 2000). 
One specific issue receiving little research attention is the allocation of the direct 
financial gains resulting from cooperative purchasing. Important reasons indicated for 
cooperative purchasing problems – dealing with differences in size, anti-trust, no commitment 
and ‘fear of parasites’ – are related to the allocation of gains (Heijboer, 2003; Schotanus, 
2004).  
Usually, purchasing consortia use the so-called Equal Price (EP) allocation concept 
for allocating price savings obtained by pooling their purchasing power: all organisations pay 
the same price per item. While practically appealing, EP may lead to unfair outcomes. For 
instance, the situation could occur that an organisation increases its purchases through the 
initiative, but in return receives a smaller amount of the total gains. This could slow down 
potential growth and harm the stability of the cooperative initiative.  
This has been reported previously by Heijboer (2003), but a systematic analysis is 
still lacking. Furthermore, it seems that many consortia using EP are unaware of its potential 
unfairness. To this end an in-depth survey was carried out as a foundation for this paper 
(Schotanus, 2004). All cooperative initiatives in this survey used EP. Most initiatives (73%) 
indicated not being aware of all possible unfairness effects of EP. The actual financial gains 
are on average indicated as being the most important reason to purchase cooperatively. Other 
studies confirm these results (Aylesworth, 2003).  
This paper provides an analytical analysis of unfair outcomes of using EP, provides 
recommendations for purchasing consortia as how to deal with it, and contributes to more 
awareness and understanding of the problem. In a more general sense this paper aims to 
contribute to the quantitative deductive development of purchasing management. The main 
questions in this paper are: (1) how does EP lead to unfair outcomes, and (2) which 
circumstances determine the extent of unfairness?  
The organisation of the paper is as follows. First, I develop a formal model of 
cooperative purchasing that enables analysing unfairness effects while using EP. In the next 
section I use the model to investigate what exactly makes EP result in unfair outcomes. I do 
this by decomposing the added value of a consortium into three components and study how 
applying EP affects each component separately. In the following section I study how the 
degree of unfairness is affected by the relative stake of each consortium member. In the final 
sections I discuss the limitations of the research, draw conclusions, and provide recom-
mendations for purchasing consortia and scholars in the field. 
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A cooperative purchasing model 
 
To analyse the effects of the Equal Price (EP) allocation concept, I model cooperative purcha-
sing initiatives by taking into account price reduction due to economies of scale (Heijboer, 
2003). Of course other issues also play a role in the success of establishing and managing 
cooperative initiatives. Here I focus on the actual cooperative financial gains as this is 
indicated as being an important reason to purchase cooperatively. Furthermore, quantity 
discounts of some products may be very dependent to i.e. individual transportation costs, 
decreasing the direct cooperative financial gains. These items are left out of the focus.  
For the price per item p(q) I assume a decreasing volume discount is given, with more 
items being purchased. Of course there is a minimum price p0, so p(q) is a convex function. 
This gives the demand elasticity of price: the change in percentage in the price resulting from 
a change in percentage in the quantity demanded (Ramsay, 1981).  
In addition, I assume the total purchasing volume ( )qpq ⋅  to be increasing with the 
number of items being bought. These assumptions hold for many practical situations (Dolan, 
1987; Melymuka, 2001). This model is defined as a Cooperative Purchasing-game or CP-
game(N,q,p) (Heijboer, 2003). N is the number of organisations, q is the number of items each 
organisation i wants to purchase and p is the price per item. The total gains function v(S) of 
each coalition S is defined as the gains it generates by buying items together compared to the 
situation where each of the organisations has to buy these items on its own: 
( ) ( ( )) ( )i i i
i S i S i S
v S q p q q p q
∈ ∈
= ⋅ − ⋅∑ ∑ i
∈
∑        (1) 
 
The model builds on cooperative game theory. In cooperative game theory it is assumed that 
gains can be made when all players cooperate. One of the problems that are addressed in this 
theory is how to divide these gains in a fair way among all players. Each of the players should 
receive a fair part of the total gains (Dyer, 2000).  
 
 
Unfairness illustrated 
 
With the following case I will illustrate the gain allocation effects of current practices in 
cooperative purchasing. Consider 3 organisations purchasing 60 items cooperatively. The 
price p for the items as a function of the quantity q that will be ordered is known as: 
 
 ( ) 20 1 1( ) 959 (1 )= ⋅ + = ⋅ +i
i i
cp q p c
q q
 for qi > 0     (2) 
 
Here p0 represents the minimum price, c1 and c2 are used to further shape and scale the 
function. The three organisations use the EP-concept: all organisations pay the price that can 
be obtained with the volume of the grand coalition N. This case can be modelled into a CP-
game as is shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: CP-game for three organisations 
 
Coalition S Quantity Price per item Total v(S) 
{1} 
{2} 
{3} 
35 
10 
15 
1.121 
1.262 
1.207 
39.246  
12.625 
18.102 
0 
0 
0 
{1,2} 
{1,3} 
{2,3} 
45 
50 
25 
1.102 
1.095 
1.151 
49.597 
54.741  
28.775  
2.273 
2.607 
1.952 
{1,2,3}=N 60 1.083 64.980 4.993 
 
Now the gains that each case organisation receives when the cooperative initiative {1,2,3} 
uses the EP-concept can be calculated and analysed:  
 
Organisation i gains: qi · (p(qi) - p(qN)) while using EP 
Organisation 1 gains: 35 · (1.121 – 1.083) = 1.341  (largest organisation) 
Organisation 2 gains: 10 · (1.262 – 1.083) = 1.795  (smallest organisation) 
Organisation 3 gains: 15 · (1.207 – 1.083) = 1.857 
 
Total gains: 1.341 + 1.795 + 1.857 = 4.993 
 
A remarkable outcome is that using EP leads to a situation where the largest organisation 
receives the smallest part of the total gains. The smallest organisation however receives the 
largest part of the total gains. The largest organisation could object to this allocation, as the 
largest organisation adds the most value to the cooperative initiative. The smallest organi-
sation adds the least value, as will be shown in the next section. Such an unfair situation could 
lead to instability in the cooperative initiative, because the largest player could leave the 
initiative or could lower its commitment.  
 
 
How does Equal Price lead to unfairness? 
 
In this section I extend the model to investigate the underlying mechanism that causes EP to 
produce unfair outcomes. I do this by formally defining the added value of consortia, breaking 
it down into three components, and studying the impact of EP on each component.  
 
The added value of a purchasing consortium 
 
In real life situations organisations can add value in several ways to a cooperative initiative. 
Here, the added value, or in other words the total gains an organisation creates for the 
cooperative initiative, is defined as the total gains of the coalition minus the value the other 
organisations can establish without organisation i (Borm, 1992): 
( ) ( ) { }( )\iM v v N v N i= −        (3)  
 
Note that in the model the larger the organisation is, the more value this organisation adds to 
the initiative. Given Mi(v) the added value of the case organisations 1 and 2 is: 
 
Organisation 1 Added Value: 4.993 – 1.952 = 3.041 (largest organisation) 
Organisation 2 Added Value: 4.993 – 2.607 = 2.386 (smallest organisation) 
 
To obtain more insight into the added value, I split this value into three different parts: (1) 
gains for and by an organisation created by joining a cooperative initiative (mi), (2) gains 
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created by an organisation for the other organisations in the initiative (ni) and, (3) gains for an 
organisation created by the other organisations in the initiative (oi). The added value M1 of i.e. 
case organisation 1 can be divided into these three types of gains as is shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: gains of organisation 1 
 
Gains Description Calculation Total 
mi = gains for and by 1  
: /
(min ( ), ( ) ( ))j ii iS i S j S i i N
q p q p q p q∈ ∈ ∈
⎧ ⎫= ⋅ −⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭∑ ∑
 
=35 ⋅ (1.121-1.083) =1.341 
ni = gains by 1 for N \ {1} 
 / /
( ( ) ( ))j j j
j S i j S i j S
q p q p q
∈ ∈ ∈
= ⋅ −∑ ∑ ∑  =25 ⋅ (1.151-1.083) =1.700 
oi = gains for 1 by N \ {1} 
 
: /
max ( ( ) ( )),0ji iS i S j S i
q p q p q
∈ ∈
⎧ ⎫= ⋅ −⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭∑  
=35 ⋅ (1.121-1.121) =0 
Total maximum claim of 1 =M1 =3.041 
 
Equal Price neglects one component of the added value 
 
The EP-concept neglects one component of the added value as is shown in theorem and proof 
1: 
Theorem 1  
The Equal Price concept neglects ni.
 
Proof ( )
/
/
/ / /
( ( ) ( ))
( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )
( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )
( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )
( ( ) ( )) 0 (
i i i i
i N
i ji i i
i N j S i
i ji i i
i N j S i
j j i ji i i
j S i j S i i N j S i
ii i
i N
equalprice v q p q p q
q p q p q p q p q
q p q p q p q p q
q p q p q p q p q p q p q
q p q p q p q
∈
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
∈
= ⋅ −
⎧ ⋅ − ≤⎪= ⎨ ⋅ − >⎪⎩
⋅ + − − ≤
= ⋅ − +
∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑
/
: :/ /
) ( )
(min ( ), ( ) ( )) max ( ( ) ( )),0
 
j i
j S i
j ii i i iS i S S i Sj S i i N j S i
i i
p q
q p q p q p q q p q p q
m o
∈
∈ ∈∈ ∈ ∈
⎧⎪⎨ >⎪⎩
j
⎧ ⎫ ⎧= ⋅ − + ⋅ − ⎫⎨ ⎬ ⎨⎩ ⎭ ⎩
= +
∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ⎬⎭
  
 
Because ni is neglected, EP is unfair in situations where organisations differ significantly in 
size: 
Organisation 1 Equal Price: (m1 + o1) = 1.341   (largest organisation) 
Organisation 2 Equal Price: (m2 + o2) = 1.795  (smallest organisation) 
Organisation 1 Added Value: (m1 + o1) + n1 = 1.341 + 1.700 = 3.041 
Organisation 2 Added Value: (m2 + o2) + n2 = 1.795 + 591 = 2.386 
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Relationship between the degree of unfairness 
in the outcomes and presence of relatively large members  
and general rules 
 
The impact of member size on mi, ni, and oi  
 
In the model there are three disadvantages to the EP-concept which apply especially to large 
members. First, ni is always increasing with more items being purchased by organisation i. 
Therefore it becomes less attractive for larger cooperative members to use the EP-concept. 
After all, ni is not incorporated in this concept, and the larger the value of ni, the more these 
members are put at a disadvantage.  
The second disadvantage is that oi becomes 0 after a certain point. This point is 
independent of the price structure (p0, c1, c2), the number of organisations, and the division of 
the volumes of these organisations. The point where oi becomes 0 is always reached when the 
volume of organisation i equals exactly 50% of the total volume of the initiative. In such a 
case a large organisation i using the EP-concept receives just the value of mi + oi = mi + 0 = 
mi. The maximum value of oi is always reached when the volume of organisation i equals 
exactly 20% of the total volume. This part of the oi-disadvantage applies therefore to 
organisations purchasing more than 20% of the total cooperative volume. In this case larger 
organisations receive a relatively small part of oi. Proofs have been omitted here.  
Thirdly, past the point where the volume of large organisation i exceeds 50% of the 
total cooperative volume, mi will become smaller by an increasing volume of organisation i. 
At least past this point the total EP-outcomes always decrease - as oi is already 0 - even if this 
organisation increases its volume through the initiative.  
 
The 38% rule 
   
Figure 1: Type of gains for organisation 2 with different quantities  
of q2 while q1+3 = 50 is constant 
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Theorem 2 
While using the EP concept and given the price function (2), consortium members 
purchasing more than 38% of the total volume are always put at a disadvantage; 
they will receive fewer gains with an increasing volume. 
 
Proof  ( )
2 2
0 1 0 1
0 2
0 2
 · ( ( ) - ( ))
 · ( ( ) - ( ))
= ·  - 
=
= ⋅ + ⋅ +
⋅ ⋅⋅
i i i
i
i
i
i
equalprice v q price q price N
c cq p c p c
q N
p c qp c q
N
 
 
Here,  and, \= +i iN q N q
 
( ) 0 2 0 2 0 21,5
0 2 0 2 0 2
1,5
1,5
1,5
'   -  + 0
22
 -  + 0
22
1 1 -  + 0
22
1 1    -  + 0
22
1 +  - 2 0
3 - 5 =  = 38 %
2
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅= =
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
=
⋅= ⋅ =⋅
=
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
p c p c p c qequalprice v
Nq N
p c p c p c q
Nq N
q
Nq N
FFR Nif q FFR N then
NFFR N N
FFR
FFR
FFR
   
 
The only dependent variable in this proof is η in the following continuous price function: 
 
( ) 20 1( )η= ⋅ +i
i
cp q p c
q
 for qi > 0      (4) 
η represents the elasticity of the price function. Until now I assumed η always being 0,5. 
However, 0,5 is an estimated average value (Dolan, 1987) and in practice η may vary. For 
values of η between -1 and 1 the following function applies (see also Figure 2): 
 
1 1 0η ηη η+⋅ − − +FFR FFR =       (5) 
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Figure 2:  Dependency of FFR to η 
 (for all η the maximum added value is reached by q=100%) 
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With an elasticity of 1,0 and a corresponding FFR of 0%, all organisations increasing their 
volume through the consortium will receive fewer gains. The smallest organisation will 
always receive the largest part of the gains. The largest organisation will always receive the 
smallest part of the gains.  
 
The 25% rule 
 
The 38% rule applies to organisations increasing or decreasing their cooperative volume. Now 
I consider the situation where the total volume of a consortium is fixed. Figure 3 illustrates 
this scenario for different quantities of organisation 2. 
 
Figure 3: Type of gains for organisation 2 with different quantities  
of q2 while N is constant 
 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
0% 25% 50% 75% 99%
q2 as a percentage of q1 + q3
M
2
n o m
 
equalpricei
equalpricei + ni = Mi
14th Annual IPSERA 2005 Conference, Archamps, France 982 
SCHOTANUS F.
  
 
 
At the point where q2 becomes 50% of the total volume, the added value of this organisation 
reaches its maximum value. At the point where q2 becomes 25% of the total volume, the EP-
outcome for organisation 2 already reaches its maximum. With theorem and proof 3 I prove 
that this is always the case in the model. Again, this percentage is independent of po, c1 and c2 
in the price structure, the number of organisations, and the division of the volumes of these 
organisations.  
To conclude, when using EP and assuming a continuous price function, organisations 
purchasing 25% of the total volume will receive the maximum allocation of gains. Larger or 
smaller members will receive a smaller amount of gains. I define 25% as the Second Fairness 
Ratio (SFR) of EP with an average price function. 
 
Theorem 3 
While using the EP concept and given the price function (2), consortium members 
purchasing 25% of the total volume will receive the maximum allocation of gains.  
 
Proof  
( )
0 2
0 2
 · ( ( ) - ( ))
= ·  - 
=
⋅ ⋅⋅
i i i
i
i
equalprice v q price q price N
p c qp c q
N
 
 
Here,  and, =N fixed
 
( ) 0 2 0 2'   -  0
2
1 1 -  0
2
4
   25%
⋅ ⋅= =
=
=
= ⋅ =
i
i
i
i
i
p c p cequalprice v
q N
q N
Nq
if q SFR N then SFR
 
  
 
Once more, the dependent variable in this proof is η. If η = -1, SFR = 50%. This is a fair 
situation as SFR equals the point where the added value reaches its maximum (50%). When η 
> -1, SFR < 50%, this could lead to an unfair situation as SFR reaches its maximum before the 
added value does. For SFR the following function applies (see also Figure 4): 
( ) 11  ηη= − ≤SFR FFR        (6) 
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Figure 4: Dependency of SFR to η  
(for all η the maximum added value is reached by q=50%) 
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Limitations and further research 
 
Before I draw conclusions I point out the main limitations of the research that should be taken 
into account. First, modelling continuous price functions is a simplification of reality. In 
reality usually graduated prices are used when quantity discounts apply (Munson, 1998). For 
instance, a price of 4.000 applies to 50-99 items, and a price of 3.900 applies to 100-199 
items. However, when an organisation needs 98 items it will usually negotiate a lower price 
than 4.000, or otherwise it will order 100 items. Therefore, I use a continuous price function in 
stead of a graduated price function. All different forms of graduated prices (Dolan, 1987) can 
be approximated by a continuous price function. Other researchers also proposed the existence 
of continuous price functions (i.e. Dolan, 1987; Jeuland, 1983; Spence, 1977).  
 Secondly, I do not take into account the costs of cooperating and other advantages 
than financial gains. This could compensate unfairness effects. Furthermore, in some cases a 
smaller company may be able to negotiate a lower price than a larger company. Obviously the 
suitability of purchasing consortia may be questioned here.  
 To increase the relevance and applicability of the results, further research will 
incorporate (1) taking into account cooperative initiative setup and transaction costs, (2) taking 
more benefits of cooperation into account than just volume discounts and (3) finding solutions 
to unfairness problems by i.e. taking into account the total added value of partners. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper I show that the Equal Price concept ignores an important part of the added value 
of organisations. Therefore this concept results in unfair allocations of gains for large 
members of cooperative initiatives, as buying groups or (electronic) purchasing consortia.  
Moreover, I conclude that under the assumption of a convex and continuously 
differentiable average price function and using Equal Price, organisations increasing their 
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volume past 38% of the total volume of a cooperative initiative will receive fewer gains. Even 
though their added value and the total gains of the cooperative initiative increase. 
Furthermore, I conclude that the Equal Price value always reaches its maximum when the 
volume of an organisation becomes 25% of the total constant volume of a cooperative 
initiative. As a result it becomes less attractive for larger organisations to cooperate.  
To conclude, if organisations are unequal in size - or size differences among 
previously similar members increase steadily - and they use the Equal Price concept, it is 
important that they address this issue in an open manner and develop solutions for it in order 
to avoid instability of the cooperative initiative on the longer term.  
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